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Abstract   
This  paper  analyzes  customary  practices  of  consensus  decision  making,  called 
musyawarah‐mufakat,  as  a  basis  of  democratic  stability  in  Indonesia.   Musyawarah 
and mufakat  (deliberation and consensus) are a  traditional decision‐making rule  in 
Indonesia which has often been observed  in village meetings.    This paper argues 
that  this  traditional decision‐making  rule  is  still  employed  even  in  a modernized 
and  democratized  Indonesia,  not  only  at  rural  assemblies  but  in  the  national 
parliament as well.    Furthermore, this consensus way of decision making provides 
an institutional basis for democratic stability by giving every parliamentary player, 
whether  big  or  small,  an  equal  opportunity  to  express  his/her  interests.    On  the 
other hand,  this  system of musyawarah‐mufakat decreases political efficiency  in  the 
sense that it takes a long time to deliberate drafted laws in the parliament. 
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Introduction 
 
     Why do some democracies succeed and others fail?  This question has long 
been debated among scholars as well as government and societal practitioners.  
Among comparative political scientists studying democracy, there have emerged 
three distinctive approaches of explaining democratic performance (Putnam 1993, 
9-12).  The first approach emphasizes institutional design.  This tradition has its 
roots in formal legal studies such as John Stuart Mill’s “Considerations on 
Representative Government.”  This school of approach has continued to 
dominate the analysis of democratic performance right into the twenty-first 
century and has developed into the most recent version of the rational choice 
institutionalism.  They argue that “institutions matter” in that institutions frame 
the incentives, strategies, and behaviors of actors in a political system.  
Appropriately established constitutions hinder all the actors from diverting from 
democratic decision making so that democratic stability is achieved.   
     The second approach emphasizes socioeconomic factors.  Political 
                                                     
† This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Workshop on Indonesia and Asian 
Democratic Transition and Reform Experiences, the Institute for Peace and Democracy, Bali, 
Indonesia, 22-25 February 2010. 
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sociologists such as Aristotle, Robert A. Dahl, Syemour Martin Lipset, and 
Barrington Moore have stressed various aspects of modernization (e.g., wealth, 
education, social class) in their discussions of the conditions underlying stable 
democracy.  They argue that economic development changes social balances 
between classes or creates a new social class (the bourgeois or middle class).  
Those structural changes, in effect, lead to democratization, and without 
modernization a country cannot attain a stable and effective democracy. 
     The third approach emphasizes sociocultural factors in explaining the 
performance of democratic institutions.  This tradition goes back to Plato, later 
Alexis de Tocqueville, and more recently, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba.  
For example, Almond and Verba argued that citizens in stable democracies are 
characterized by a particular set of widely shared attitudes and values which they 
called the "civic culture."  Citizens in stable democracies possess a relatively 
common set of understandings about the appropriate boundaries of government, 
the sanctity of political rights, and the duties of citizens to preserve them: “If there 
is no consensus within society, there can be little potentiality for the peaceful 
resolution of political differences that is associated with the democratic process” 
(Almond and Verba 1963, 358).  Robert A. Putnam (1993), in his Making 
Democracy Work, also argues that democratic stability depends on a specific form of 
social organization and citizen values which he calls “civic traditions.”  The 
literature on democratic consolidation also recognizes the importance of citizen 
values, norms, and traditions.  For example, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan argue 
that democracy, to be consolidated, has to be “routinized and deeply internalized 
in social, institutional, and even psychological life” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5). 
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     Indonesian scholars have become quite familiar with the cultural approaches 
in studying the politics and society of this country.  The most obvious exemplar is 
the conceptualization of aliran politics by Clifford Geertz (1973) which is still 
influential in analyzing electoral and party politics in Indonesia.  Besides, 
Indonesianists often discuss the political and societal effects of gotong royong 
(mutual help), kekeluargaan (familism), and musyawarah-mufakat 
(deliberation-and-consensus) to name a few.  However, after Indonesia was 
democratized, the 1945 Constitution was totally amended to become a wholly new 
constitution; universal human rights were introduced, and free competition 
among political forces is guaranteed in electoral, legislative, and governmental 
arenas. Meanwhile studying the political culture of Indonesia is in decline.  
Probably since Western democratic systems and practices have been fully accepted 
in Indonesia of the 21st century, traditional cultures are no longer attracting the 
attention of Indonesian scholars.   
     In this paper I would like to bring political culture back into the political 
analysis of Indonesia’s democracy.  I focus particularly on the traditional 
decision-making rule of musyawarah-mufakat, and I will present a hypothesis that 
customary practices of musyawarah-mufakat, which can still be observed in various 
political and social settings from the village community to the national legislature, 
have contributed to the successful democratic consolidation of Indonesia. 
 
I. Musyawarah-Mufakat in Indonesian Politics 
 
      For many of the peoples of Indonesia as well as Indonesian scholars, 
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unanimous consent is an indigenous decision-making rule (Logsdon 1978, 96).  
Soetardjo (1953, 102) argues, “according to original Indonesian law, every decision, 
whether accepted or rejected, has to be taken with unanimous consent.”  On the 
other hand, he dismisses a majority vote system like that employed in Western 
democracies since it is not familiar to the Indonesian people (Soetardjo 1953, 102).   
     According to Koentjaraningrat, musyawarah and mufakat grew out of a 
cooperative spirit that underlies the village sense of community in most 
Indonesian cultures. 
An important manifestation of the gotong-royong ethos in most Indonesian 
village communities is the institution of musyawarah.  The concept involves 
the processes that develop general agreement and consensus in village 
assemblies, which emerge as the unanimous decision or mufakat.  This 
unanimous decision can be reached by a process in which the majority and 
minorities approach each other by making the necessary readjustments in 
their respective viewpoints, or by an integration of the contrasting standpoints 
into a new conceptual synthesis.  Musyawarah and mufakat thus exclude the 
possibility that the majority will impose its views on the minorities 
(Koentjaraningrat 1967, 397). 
     However, outsiders cannot necessarily observe a consensus-building process 
in a village meeting, therefore “it often appears as if it were the head of the village 
who determines everything in an authoritarian manner, while all other members 
of the village community act only to approve his decisions (as yes-men)” 
(Koentjaraningrat 2009, 44, fn. 2).  In reality, intensive lobbying is conducted 
behind the scenes to find an agreeable point between those who proposed and 
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opposed.  Therefore, the official meeting to vote for a final decision is only 
ceremonial after all the behind-the-scene maneuvers were completed.  
Koentjaraningrat considers the reason why such a system of conducting meetings 
is employed in rural communities lies in “a corresponding element in the attitudes 
of the Javanese, which is to avoid at all costs controversy in public” 
(Koentjaraningrat 2009, 44, fn. 2). 
     While musyawarah-mufakat is considered as growing out of rural tradition, it 
has also been incorporated into the national political system.  Musyawarah is one 
of the five pillars of the Five State Principles, Pancasila, declaring that “democracy 
guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations (Permusyawaratan) amongst 
representatives.”  Article 2 of the 1945 Constitution states that all decisions of the 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) shall be taken by a majority vote, but when 
Soekarno established his Guided Democracy, the return to the 1945 Constitution 
included adoption of unanimous consent (mufakat) as the decision-making rule in 
the Parliament.  Soeharto also recognized the importance of the 
musyawarah-mufakat rule to achieve political stability under his authoritarian 
regime.  For example, the 1978 People’s Consultative Assembly Decision on 
Pancasila Ethics Education (Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik 
Indonesia Nomor II/MPR/1978 tentang Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila 
[Ekaprasetia Pancakarsa]) stipulates that decisions should be made only after 
deliberation (musyawarah) has reached unanimous consent (mufakat) and that the 
Indonesian nation have to respect decisions made through musyawarah and have 
the responsibility to accept or implement those decisions. 
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II. Musyawarah-Mufakat in Democratized Indonesia 
 
     Considering that the decision-making rule of musyawarah-mufakat was used 
for repressive purposes by both Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s authoritarian 
governments, there was no forceful adoption of the rule after democratization in 
1998.  For example, the 1999 Law on Local Government (Undang-undang Nomor 
22 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemerintahan Daerah) did not stipulate usage of the 
musyawarah-mufakat rule, even allowing village assemblies to adopt majority 
decision making.  In reality, however, village assemblies after democratization 
and decentralization have adopted both majority rule and musyawarah-mufakat rule 
in a flexible way.  Kosuke Mizuno has found that there are still strong tendencies 
to emphasize the musyawarah-mufakat rule in the decision-making process of 
village assemblies while majority voting is also observed especially in the 
reactivated village development councils (Mizuno 2006).   
     The decision-making rule of unanimous consent through deliberation is still 
used, even after democratization, in the legislative process in the national 
parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat: DPR).  The Rules of Procedure of the 
Parliament (Peraturan Tata Tertib DPR RI) call upon factions to endeavor to 
deliberate (musyawarah) as much as possible to achieve unanimous consent 
(mufakat).  It is supposedly not until the failure to achieve unanimous consent that 
the rule of decision making by majority is allowed to be used.  Many of the 
legislators hold to the norm that the parliament should avoid deciding by vote 
(Ziegenhain 2008, 161-163).  In effect, there is only a small amount of legislation 
that is passed by majority vote.  Even in cases where a specific bill in a 
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preliminary session is decided on by majority vote, such voting is hardly ever 
done at the committee stage.  The amended 1945 Constitution also stipulates that 
each bill shall be discussed by the parliament and the president until reaching joint 
approval, thus requiring consensus between the legislators and the president. 
 
III. Musyawarah-Mufakat and Democratic Stability 
 
     Is musyawarah-mufakat an outdated decision-making rule for democratized 
Indonesia?  Is it inappropriate under democracy since it suppresses the raising of 
opposing opinions?  Will it disappear as democracy is consolidated in Indonesia?  
I will argue here that musyawarah-mufakat can function to consolidate Indonesia’s 
democracy in the way that it functions to integrate plural societies.   
     Under the Soeharto regime musyawarah-mufakat was used to prevent the 
expression of opposing opinions in the public sphere.  Musyawarah-mufakat was 
achieved only among political or community elites, or it was achieved through the 
show of force whether implicit or explicit.  This could happen since, as 
Koentjaraningrat accurately recognized, musyawarah and mufakat imply the 
existence of personalities who, by virtue of their leadership, are able to bring 
together the contrasting viewpoints or who have enough imagination to arrive at a 
synthesis integrating the contrasting viewpoints into a new conception 
(Koentjaraningrat 1967, 397).  Under the vertical interactions of authoritarianism, 
it only functioned to force the people to obey government instructions. 
     However, with democratization and the guarantee of political rights, 
musyawarah-mufakat cannot be forced from above any more.  I would rather argue 
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that it provides an institutional basis for democratic stability.  In democratic 
settings, musyawarah-mufakat can be conceptualized as giving all the players 
concerned a veto power.  In particular, it provides both majorities and minorities 
with an equal veto power so that minorities can prevent majorities from violating 
the former’s rights and interests unilaterally.  When minorities face a situation 
where their critical rights and interests are at risk, they will even resort to 
extra-constitutional or undemocratic actions such as a coup d’etat in order to 
protect their rights and interests.  Creating many veto points can secure credible 
commitment by all the players to democracy.  Even if the one side transgresses 
the other’s rights and interests unilaterally, the latter can veto such action, and the 
status quo is restored.  As long as any single veto player does not agree to change, 
the status quo is always chosen.  Thus, many veto players affect the stability of 
policies, the government, and the political regime.  
     While veto points create political stability, they also affect policy efficiency.  
The more veto players there are, the more difficult it is to attain agreement among 
the actors, and the less efficient the policy response to changing environment is.  
In fact, policy inefficiency can be observed in Indonesian legislation.  The author 
has found that Indonesia’s parliament has not been so productive in legislation 
since democratization despite of the great need to enact various laws in order to 
adjust the legal system to the new democratic environment (Kawamura 
forthcoming).   
     Table 1 shows the number of laws and other regulations enacted under 
post-democratization governments.  We have to be careful when comparing the 
number of enacted laws and regulations since there were differences in terms of 
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governments and political institutions during the four-year period of 
constitutional amendments between 1999 and 2002, but the most productive 
government in enacting laws after democratization was that of President  Habibie, 
which enacted 66 laws during his presidential term of one year and five months, 
or 45 laws per year.  Most of the 66 laws were proposed by the government.  By 
contrast, the government that was least productive in enacting laws was Wahid’s.  
Only 51 laws were established during his term of one year and nine months, or 28 
laws per year.  Finally, the number of enacted laws under the Megawati 
government was 122, or 36 per year, while the number of enacted laws under the 
first Yudhoyono government (until the end of January 2009) was 153, or 34 per 
year.  When we look at the number of laws proposed by these two governments, 
it further decreases to 29 laws per year for Megawati and 15 laws per year for 
Yudhoyono.  These numbers show quantitatively that the government and the 
parliament have failed to pass necessary laws.   
 
Table 1.  Number of Established Laws
Habibie Wahid Megawati 1st Yudhoyono
Law 66 51 122 153
Proposed by Government 61 48 94 67
Initiated by MPs 5 3 28 86
The Number of Established Laws per Year 45.4 28.3 36.7 34.8
Laws Proposed by Government per Year 43.1 27.3 29.0 15.6
Laws Proposed by Government per Year except for
Laws on New Regional Government
28.9 14.2 17.9 15.6
Government Regulation in lieu of Law (Perpu) 3 3 4 12
Government Regulation (PP) 118 219 211 321
Presidential Regulation --- --- --- 384
Presidential Decision (Kepres) 255 318 350 100
Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 31 17 21 36
Source : Kawamura (Forthcoming).
Note : The data refer to the first Yudhoyono government as of the end of January 2009.  
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      Legislative inefficiency can also be observed when we analyze deliberation 
periods, which refers not to the total number of days spent deliberating the bill, 
but to the period from the day that the bill was presented to parliament to the day 
of its ratification by the president, enabling the bill to be promulgated as a law.  
Table 2 shows the average periods of deliberation under the Megawati and 
Yudhoyono governments.  Under the Yudhoyono government, it took over a 
year on average to enact a law.  The deliberation periods for the laws proposed 
by the government were a little shorter than for those proposed by the legislature, 
but even so, it took almost a year to turn these government-proposed bills into 
legislation.  It should be noted in particular that it took on average over 600 days 
to deliberate economic laws.   This indicates that, although the most pressing 
issues before the Yudhoyono government were economic growth, the creation of 
employment opportunities, and the eradication of poverty, Yudhoyono could not 
effect a speedy passage of bills even on legislative procedures related to his own 
policy requirements. 
     While long periods of deliberation and a small number of approved bills 
were caused by the weak legislative power of the president, his weak partisan 
power, and the fragility of coalitions (Kawamura forthcoming), the 
musyawarah-mufakat principle embodied in the legislative decision-making process 
worsened delays in legislation.  In other words, Indonesia has achieved 
democratic stability at the sacrifice of political efficiency.   
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Table 2.  Periods of Deliberation
Megawati 1st Yudhoyono
Number
of Laws
(N) Period
(days)
Number
of Laws
(N) Period
(days)
Average period of Deliberation 122 66 250.0 153 141 397.7
Laws Proposed by Government 94 49 166.6 67 56 355.3
Politics & Justice 17 8 392.5 7 7 435.0
Local Autonomy 1 0 n/a 3 3 74.5
Economy 23 4 557.5 21 18 606.5
Society & Religion 1 0 n/a 6 5 95.0
Budget 8 0 n/a 9 8 86.9
Settlement 4 0 n/a 4 4 473.0
New Regional Government 36 35 74.4 0 --- ---
Ratification 4 2 95.5 17 11 137.5
Perpu 4 1 94.0 12 7 110.4
Laws Initiated by MPs 28 17 490.4 86 85 419.4
Politics & Justice 9 9 610.0 10 10 744.4
Local Autonomy 4 2 375.5 2 2 429.5
Economy 7 1 759.0 6 6 622.8
Society 3 1 737.0 5 5 453.8
Religion 0 --- --- 3 2 1057.0
New Regional Government 5 4 149.8 60 60 321.0
Source : Kawamura (Forthcoming).
Note : The data refer to the first Yudhoyono government as of the end of January 2009.  
 
Conclusion 
 
     The experience of Indonesia’s successful democratization poses many 
interesting questions for scholars as well as government officials, and the causes 
for this success story have yet to be fully analyzed theoretically or comparatively.  
Indonesian scholars tend to speak and write in their own language which cannot 
be easily understood by scholars studying other countries.  We have to change 
our academic culture to share Indonesia’s experience with scholars from all over 
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the world, something that is particularly necessary in the studies of political 
culture. 
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